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“I believe in corporations. They are indispensable instruments of
our modern civilization; but . . . they should . . . act for the interests
of the community as a whole.” 1
Theodore Roosevelt
INTRODUCTION
The notion of corporations considering community interests is
not new. As early as 1905, Roosevelt highlighted the need for
corporations to align their interests with those of surrounding
communities. Yet, despite his sound pronouncement, the
misalignment present today between corporate and community
interests continues to persist.
A number of recent events highlight this ongoing conflict. It can
be seen in the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, which contaminated
the southern parts of the U.S.; 2 in the continuing release of toxic
sludge by Massey Energy Corporation into the water supply of
eastern Kentucky and West Virginia; 3 and in the environmental
contamination of the rainforest by Texaco in Ecuador. 4 However,
one of the most compelling illustrations of a corporation explicitly

1. ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE & JOHN MICKLETHWAIT, THE COMPANY: A SHORT
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 182 (2003) (quoting President Theodore Roosevelt).
2. Jim Polson, BP Oil Still Ashore One Year After End of Gulf Spill, BLOOMBERG, July
15, 2011, available at www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2011-07-15/bp-oil-still-washingashore-one-year-after-end-of-gulf-spill.html.
3. Geraldine Sealey, Sludge Spill Pollutes Ky., W. Va. Waters: Worst Regional Disaster in
Years, ABC NEWS, Oct. 23, 2002, available at abcnews.go.com/US/print?id=95285; Dylan
Lovan, Inez Coal Slurry Spill: Toxic Sludge From Massey Facility Still Pollutes Kentucky Town a
Decade After Disaster, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 10, 2010, available at
www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/11/inez-coal-slurry-spillto_n_757900.html?view=print&comm_ref=false.
4. AMAZON WATCH, CHEVRONTOXICO: THE CAMPAIGN FOR JUSTICE IN ECUADOR
(2012), available at http://chevrontoxico.com/about/amazon-watch-capaign.
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choosing to disassociate itself from the interests of its operating
community is that of Royal Dutch and Shell (“Shell”) in Nigeria.
Shell has conducted oil exploration activities in the Niger Delta
region of Nigeria for many years, much to the discontent of the local
community, the Ogoni. 5 In the late 1990s, the Ogoni community
formally organized its oppositional efforts against Shell and, shortly
thereafter, the Nigerian government threatened to execute some of
the Ogoni leaders. 6 Despite mounting pressure on Shell to intervene
in the execution, it chose instead to publicly dissociate itself from the
interests of the Ogoni. 7 As Shell stated, a “commercial organization
such as ours cannot and should not sit in judgment on [these]
matters.” 8
Nevertheless, after the execution of the Ogoni leaders, Shell
began to face international boycotts of its products 9 and a host of
lawsuits for its alleged participation in the executions. 10 Even today,
Shell’s actions in the Ogoni community are under scrutiny as the
Supreme Court decides liability in the highly publicized Kiobel
case. 11 Thus, despite a marked attempt to disassociate itself from the
interests of its operating community, Shell’s corporate interests
remain, at least partially, linked to the community’s fate.
Shell’s and other corporations’ failures to align their interests
with that of the community, in many ways, are indicative of the
practice of separating issues of business from issues of the
5. For an account of Shell’s activities in the Niger Delta, see generally BRONWEN
MANBY, CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON ETHICS AND INT’L AFFAIRS, SHELL IN NIGERIA:
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE OGONI CRISIS, CASE STUDY #20, (2000).
6. Id. at 5–6.
7. Rob Nixon, The Oil Weapon, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1995, at A31; Press Release,
Shell Petroleum Development Company, Execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and His CoDefendants (November 14, 1995), available at http://crudeimpact.com/discuss-theissues/ken-saro-wiwa/execution-of-ken-saro-wiwa.
8. WILLIAM F. SCHULZ, IN OUR OWN BEST INTEREST: HOW DEFENDING HUMAN
RIGHTS BENEFITS US ALL 68 (2001).
9. Mel Wilson & Rosie Lombardi, Globalization and its Discontents: The Arrival of
Triple Bottom-Line Reporting, IVEY BUS. J., Sept.–Oct. 2001, available at
http://www.iveybusinessjournal.com/topics/global-business/globalization-and-itsdiscontents-the-arrival-of-triple-bottom-linereporting#.UH7GS2dJF0s.
10. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). Along with
Wiwa v. Andersen, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum was ultimately settled by Shell for $15.5
million. A third lawsuit was dismissed: Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum Development Co., No. 04-cv02665-KMW-HBP (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2008).
11. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 472 (2011).
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community. German scholar Ferdinand Tönnies has argued that the
world is divided into a community or Gemeinschaft, as he terms it,
and society or Gesellschaft, by which he means business or the
commercial. 12 For Tönnies, the separation of these two aspects of the
world is so marked that he finds the notion of a corporateGemeinschaft ”abominable.” 13 For Tönnies, corporations that ignore
or discount community issues are seemingly unable or unwilling to
view corporations and communities as complements.
Yet, there are a small but growing number of corporations that
have adopted a contrary view. These corporations contend that
corporate and community interests are not distinct but can, in some
cases, be united. Corporations adopting this approach cite several
advantages to this approach, including increased public trust in the
company, development of local talent, easier recruitment of new
employees, and sustainability of their investments. 14 At the same
time, communities in which this approach has been adopted view the
investments in their community as sustainable and responsive to
their interests.
Given the mutual benefits to both corporations and communities
that corporate consideration of community interests can bring, this
Article argues that corporations should adopt a proactive stance to
community interests. In particular, it contends that corporations
should leverage their core business capabilities to foster the
sustainable interests of the community in consultation with the
community. In doing so, it rejects Tönnies’ abhorrence of a
corporate-community relationship and instead proposes a novel
approach to corporate governance that views the relationship
between corporations and community as symbiotic—a redefined
12. FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY 34 (Charles P. Loomis trans.,
2011).
th
13. Id. The late 18 century, when Tönnies first drew a distinction between
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, was a time of growing industrialization and urbanization.
Tönnies’ observations were made as he despaired the growing shift from a community-based
society towards a commercial-based society in which self-interest would dominate. Whereas
membership in a Gemeinschaft would entail a member serving the interests of the group,
membership in a Gesellschaft was instrumental: membership in the group would only be useful
insofar as it furthered his individual goals. For this reason, Tönnies could not envision a
Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft as they would be antithetical to each other’s purposes.
14. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, INC., BUILDING THE CORPORATE COMMUNITY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TEAM 12 (1998); A.M. Esteves, Mining and Social Development:
Refocusing Community Investment Using Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, 33 RESOURCES
POL’Y. 39, 40 (2008).
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Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft to borrow Tönnies’ terms. Under this view,
corporate decision-making for community interests is premised on
aligning and fostering both the interests of corporations and the
interests of communities.
This Article’s approach does not wholly adopt either
contractarianism or stakeholder theory, the two dominant theories of
corporate governance. 15 Instead, this Article makes a distinctive
contribution to the literature in the area by proposing that
corporations identify with their operating communities as a means of
fostering sustainable community interests. Drawing from social
identity theory, it contends that corporations that adopt the
“identity” of the communities in which they operate are better able
to adhere to the values and norms of the community. As a result,
identification can offer the basis under which corporate fostering of
community interests gives rise to sustainable impacts on the
community rather than a mere public relations exercise.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces and defines the
notion of community and describes the importance and the
idiosyncratic nature of the relationship between corporations and
communities. It concludes by exploring the shortcomings of existing
models for governing corporate community relations. Part II begins
to develop the Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach to corporate
governance for community interests by revisiting the two dominant
strands of corporate governance theories, contractarianism and
stakeholder theory, and examines their advantages and
disadvantages. It then goes on to describe the GesellschaftGemeinschaft approach, its benefits, and how it draws from, but fails
to wholly adopt, both dominant corporate governance theories.
Part III turns to a discussion of aligning corporate community
interests by having the corporation identify with the operating
community. This Part provides a brief overview of social identity
theory before exploring three case studies in which corporations have
sought to identify with the communities in which they operate. It
concludes by exploring the benefits of corporate identification with
the operating community. Finally, Part IV turns to explore methods
by which corporate-community interest alignment can be regulated.
It explores both public regulation and self-regulation as possible
15. David K. Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 523, 523–25 (2011).
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mechanisms and concludes that a hybrid system may be best to
facilitate a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach to corporate decisionmaking.
I. CORPORATIONS AND COMMUNITIES
While many corporations—like Shell in Nigeria—have chosen
to dismiss or discount community interests, there have been a
number of different efforts taken to ensure a more harmonious
relationship between corporations and communities. Before
reviewing
existing
corporate-community
governance
mechanisms, however, it may be prudent to begin by defining
the term “community” and examining the importance and
uniqueness of corporate-community relationships.
A. What is the Community?
The Oxford dictionary defines the term “community” as a group
of people living in the same place or having common interests or
attitudes. 16 Community sociologists argue, however, that community
cannot be ascribed such a basic definition. One highly noted study in
the field found, for instance, that there are over ninety competing
definitions of the term “community” with the only commonality
between the definitions being that they dealt with people. 17
German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies’ 1887 book,
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (“Community and Society”), a pioneer
in community studies, offers a starting point for defining the term
“community.” 18 Tönnies defines Gemeinschaft as a small, close-knit
community unified by shared experiences, values, and norms. 19 He
contrasts this against Gesellschaft, or large-scale, impersonal,
commercial society, linked only by the transactions involved in the
pursuit of individual self-interests. 20 For Tönnies then, a community
is marked by unified values and norms and is antithetical to the
notion of pursuit of rational self-interest.
16. OXFORD DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
english/community?q=community (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
17. See generally George A. Hillery, Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement, 20
RURAL SOCIOLOGY 111 (1955).
18. TÖNNIES, supra note 12.
19. FERDINAND TÖNNIES, TÖNNIES: COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY xli
(Jose Harris ed., 2001).
20. Id.
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Building on the work of Tönnies, modern community
sociologists have further subdivided the types of communities. 21
Among these types of communities are “community of place”—
defined by the physical proximity of the members—and “community
of interest,” which includes members who share the same interests
but are not necessarily in physical proximity to each other. 22
One scholar has argued, however, that the notion of community
cannot be defined so precisely. Instead, he contends that the
definition of community should be fluid. As Kapelus observes:
[C]ommunities can be identified on the basis of any number of
shared traits such as geographic territory, religion, culture, history,
kinship, etc. . . . [P]eople can have multiple, overlapping identities
and these identities can change overtime [sic]. This means that any
definition of a community is always a construct, an imposing of
order that does not necessarily fit the lived experience of the people
in question . . . . [D]ifferent definitions based upon different
criteria include and exclude different people. 23

Randels, however, prefers to define a community as a framework.
As he notes, a community is a “framework of shared beliefs, interests,
and commitments unit[ing] a set of varied groups and activities . . .
that establish a common . . . fate, . . . a sense of belonging, and a
supportive structure of activities and relationships.” 24
While no one definition of community is authoritative, by
distilling the common elements that appear from each of these
definitions, a broad definition of the term “community” begins to
emerge. Accordingly, a community is a group of people who are
generally proximate to each other either in location or interests,
share values and norms, possess a common culture or identity, or

21. Laura Dunham, R. Edward Freeman & Jeanne Liedtka, The Soft Underbelly of
Stakeholder Theory: The Role of Community 11 (Darden Bus. Sch., Working Paper No.01-22,
2001).
22. Id. at 12–13.
23. Paul Kapelus, Mining, Corporate Social Responsibility and the “Community”: The
Case of Rio Tinto, Richards Bay Minerals and The Mbonambi, 39 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 275, 281
(2002).
24. George D. Randels, Jr., Loyalty, Corporations, and Community, 11 BUS. ETHICS Q.
27, 35 (2001) (alteration in original) (emphasis removed) (quoting PHILIP SELZNICK, THE
MORAL COMMONWEALTH. SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY 358–59
(1992)).
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share a common fate. A community may possess only one of these
attributes or some combination of all of them. 25
B. The Importance of Corporate-Community Relationships
Having defined “community,” we now turn to examine the
importance of corporate-community relationships. Corporate social
responsibility literature is rife with references to community interests
yet, for the most part, the individual importance of the corporatecommunity relationship has not been given much importance.
Instead, the need for corporations to consider community interests
has usually been consolidated with the interests of a wide variety of
other corporate constituents—creditors, employees, and suppliers,
for instance—suggesting that the community’s interests are
comparable to the interests of these other stakeholders. 26
However, in many instances, the corporate-community
relationship is very different from a corporation’s relationship with
other stakeholders. This is in part because communities—unlike
creditors, employees, and suppliers—usually lack the ability to
negotiate their relationship with the corporation. 27 As the residents
of the Niger Delta or Louisiana communities can attest, their
relationship with Shell and BP, respectively, was involuntary. 28
At the same time, although communities do not necessarily
willingly enter into relationships with the corporation, it is the
community that is most directly affected when corporations engage
in adverse acts. 29 For instance, while a corporation’s gas leak will
25. A government, however, is not a proxy for a community. As Dunham et al. note,
“[g]overnment, while it derives its legitimacy from community, cannot be equated with
community.” Dunham et al., supra note 21, at 13.
26. For instance, Blair and Stout argue in their team production model that a
corporation depends upon the firm-specific investments of numerous stakeholders, including
shareholders, employees, creditors, and communities, seemingly suggesting that the interests of
these stakeholders are comparable. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
27. As the government of a country cannot be equated to a local community, even if a
government negotiates with a corporation to locate its operations in a particular community,
the community does not necessarily consent to the corporation’s presence. See Dunham et al,
supra note 21, at 13.
28. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1920 (1991). As Hansmann and Kraakman observe,
“[t]ort victims, unlike contract creditors, cannot assess the potential credit-worthiness of a
corporation before they are injured,” making them “involuntary creditors.” Id.
29. Kapelus, supra note 23, at 280.
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inevitably damage its relationships with its employees, creditors, and
even shareholders, it is the community that will most heavily bear
the consequences. 30
The corporate-community relationship also differs from the
corporation’s relationship with other stakeholders since in some cases
the collective action power of the community to interfere with the
corporation’s operations far exceeds that of creditors, employees, or
suppliers. Indeed, in some cases, communities have been able to
completely halt the operations of large multinational corporations. 31
Fostering good relations with the community can, in some cases,
therefore, be integral to the overall viability of corporate operations.
Furthermore, good corporate-community relations can reduce
costs for the corporation. Corporations that possess good
relationships with their operating communities face less community
disruptions or protests. 32 As one corporation observed, good
community relations “cut down” on lead time, disputes, and project
delays. 33 Fostering community interests can also save corporations
indirect costs that arise from charges from external environmental or
labor groups. 34 Indeed, corporations that can convincingly evidence
that the community is benefiting from its operations are provided
with a “cloak of legitimacy that serves to protect them from charges”
from outside interest groups. 35 Corporate attention to community
interests can also serve to increase the legitimacy of the corporation

30. For example, in the Bhopal disaster, forty tons of toxin leaked out of Union Carbide
Co.’s pesticide factory and settled over the local community in Bhopal, killing 3,500 people
within days and more than 15,000 since the incident occurred in 1984. See Bhopal Trial: Eight
Convicted Over India Gas Disaster, BBC NEWS (last updated June 7, 2010),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8725140.stm.
31. For instance, both the Tambogrande community in Peru and the Esquel community
in Argentina were able to completely halt two giant mining corporations from commencing
operations in their community. See Peru |Tambogrande: Manhattan Minerals, EARTHWORKS
(last
visited
Oct.
3,
2012),
http://www.earthworksaction.org/voices/detail/tambogrande_voice;
Marcela
Valente,
Argentina: Local Opponents of Mine Sued by Meridian Gold, INTER PRESS SERVICE NEWS
AGENCY (Feb. 15, 2007), http://www.ipsnews.net/2007/02/argentina-local-opponents-ofmine-sued-by-meridian-gold.
32. Dunham et al., supra note 21, at 5.
33. Kapelus, supra note 23, at 285.
34. Dunham et al., supra note 21, at 5.
35. Kapelus, supra note 23, at 280; see also Dunham et al., supra note 21, at 5.
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with governments facilitating governmental permits and consent to
future projects. 36
C. Governing the Relationship Between Corporations and
Communities
Given the importance of positive relations between corporations
and communities, it is not surprising that rules governing corporate
activities authorize corporate consideration of community interests.
For example, the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of
Corporate Governance observe that corporations create
“interdependencies” with groups such as members of the
communities in which the corporation operates and sanction the
subordination of short-term profits to maintain community
interests. 37 Similarly, state constituency statutes, which enable
corporate managers to consider non-economic interests when faced
with a takeover bid, also permit corporations to consider community
interests. 38 Courts have also recognized the discretion given to
directors to consider community interests. 39 However, neither the
ALI principles nor constituency statutes nor courts mandate
corporate consideration of community interests. In fact, the one
constituency statute that obliged directors to consider community
interests was recently amended and rephrased in the permissive. 40
Conversely, the recently revised OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises have attempted to impose positive duties
on corporations in relation to communities. The Guidelines state
that corporations should encourage local capacity by working with
the local community, 41 implement self-regulatory practices in order
to foster a relationship of confidence and trust with the operating
community, 42 and “engage with relevant stakeholders” in order to be
36. Kapelus, supra note 23, at 287.
37. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.01 cmt. f (1992).
38. For an overview of constituency statutes, see Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two
Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility into the Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
631, 644–45 (2009).
39. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
40. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756 (West 2010).
41. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES
19
(2011),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/29/48004323.pdf (Guideline A(3)).
42. Id. (Guideline A(7)).
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able to take into account their views in planning. 43 Nevertheless, as
the Guidelines are not legally enforceable and contain only
recommendations aimed at creating a best practices guide for
corporations, their influence over corporate decision-making vis-à-vis
community interests remains mainly aspirational. 44
Several industry groups have also advocated in favor of corporate
consideration of community interests. Under the Equator Principles,
for instance, certain lending institutions involved in project financing
recommend that corporations engage with the community. 45 The
Forest Stewardship Council adopts a comparable approach, requiring
corporations to obtain community consent for certain forest
operations. 46
More recently, both the International Finance Corporation
(IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank, and the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) have adopted a
mandatory approach to corporate consideration of community
interests. The IFC, for instance, requires that corporations operating
projects that it funds adhere to community-focused performance
standards. 47 Although the IFC acknowledges the role of public
authorities in protecting public health and security, it mandates that
corporations “avoid or minimize the risks and impacts to community
health, safety, and security that may arise from project relatedactivities, with particular attention to vulnerable groups.” 48
Similarly, the EBRD requires that corporations whose projects
involve impacts on traditional or customary lands under use, cultural

43. Id. at 20 (Guideline A(14)).
44. For example, Goldcorp Corporation in Guatemala has repeatedly violated these
community interest guidelines without facing repercussions. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., ANNUAL REPORT ON THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 2011: A NEW AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 55–60 (2011), available at
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/governance/annual-report-onthe-oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-2011_mne-2011-en.
45. EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASS’N, THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES 1, 3, 4 (2006), available
at http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/equator_principles.pdf.
46. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, FSC PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA FOR FOREST
STEWARDSHIP 5 (2002), available at https://ca.fsc.org/download.principles(Principle 2.2).
47. INT’L FIN. CORP., IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND
SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 27 (2012), available at http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/
c8f524004a73daeca09afdf998895a12/IFC_Performance_Standards.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
(Performance Standard 4).
48. Id.
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resources, or resettlement of communities, obtain the prior consent
of the community to the project. 49 As part of the process of
obtaining the community’s consent to the project, the corporation is
mandated, first, “to avoid adverse effects” and second, to minimize
and mitigate any potential adverse impacts. 50
While the IFC and ERBD’s policies foster a more stringent
approach to corporate consideration of community interests, they are
limited in their scope. Both policies only pertain to projects funded
by these institutions. In addition, the ERBD only mandates its
community consent policy for certain specified projects and only for
projects that affect indigenous communities. 51 Thus, to date there
remains an absence of an industry-neutral, overarching governance
approach to corporate consideration of community interests.
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORIES AND COMMUNITY
INTERESTS
While the value of corporate consideration of community
interests is discernible from the myriad of existing corporatecommunity governance mechanisms, it is unclear why most of the
mechanisms have taken a relatively lax approach to the issue. A
possible answer is that they permit, but generally do not oblige,
corporate consideration of community interests because they mirror
the ambiguous approach of corporate law. While the debate over
whether the purpose of the corporation is to serve shareholders’
interests exclusively or whether it is to serve the interests of a wider
array of corporate constituents has persisted since the 1930’s, 52
corporate law has chosen an indeterminate position within the two
sides of the debate, failing to wholly adopt either position. 53 Existing
49. EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., ENVIRONMENTAL AND
SOCIAL POLICY 50 (2008), available at http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/
policies/2008policy.pdf (Performance Requirement 7).
50. Id. at 52.
51. EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., INDIGENOUS PEOPLES:
GUIDANCE NOTE 6 (2010), available at http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/
guides/indp.pdf.
52. This debate began in the pages of the Harvard Law Review between Berle and
Dodd. See Adolf A. Berle Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
53. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 261 (1992); Choudhury, supra note 38, at 633. More recently, in
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governance mechanisms for corporate-community relationships have,
seemingly, continued this approach.
To be sure, the lacuna in the law’s definition of corporate
purpose has not prevented scholars from developing their own
models. Today, scholarly literature on corporate governance falls
essentially into one of two factions: contractarianism, which views
corporations as vehicles of shareholder wealth maximization, and
stakeholder theory, which both views corporations as public
institutions that should serve more than the interests of shareholders
and tends to equate the interests of shareholders with the interests of
non-shareholders.
Governing corporate-community relationships, however, does
not necessarily fall into either existing faction. Corporate
consideration of community interests may appear initially at odds
with a concept of shareholder wealth maximization. However, it
does not fall comfortably into a stakeholder theorists’ notion of
equivalency between shareholders and non-shareholders. Instead,
governing corporate-community relationships may best be achieved
by aligning corporate-community interests in a manner that seeks to
foster the interests of both the corporation and the community. The
result is a corporation-community—or, to use Tönnies’ terms, a
Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft—approach to decision-making. Under this
approach, corporate decision-making in relation to community
interests is premised on some of the advantages of both
contractarianism and stakeholder theory while, at the same time,
assuaging their shortcomings. However, to fully understand how a
Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach differs from the two dominant
theories, it may be useful to briefly review these theories and
ascertain their principal benefits and flaws in the context of
community interests.

eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010), the Delaware Chancery
Court held that directors must act “to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of
its stockholders,” suggesting that the debate of the corporate purpose had been resolved. Id. at
60–61. Nevertheless, the court went on to acknowledge that directors could act to protect
non-shareholder interests so long as the act benefits shareholder interests in the long run and
noted that, under the business judgment rule, it would not scrutinize the benefits ultimately
obtained by the shareholders. Id. at 57–58. Consequently, the eBay decision still allows
considerable discretion for directors to pursue non-shareholder interests, thereby reinforcing
corporate law’s agnostic position.
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A. Contractarianism
Contractarians view corporations as a “nexus of contracts,” a
metaphor that represents the implicit and explicit voluntary
arrangements that affected parties will work out among themselves. 54
Viewed in this manner, the corporation is seen not as a thing, but as
a legal fiction representing the complex arrangements set up by those
who provide inputs to the firm. 55 The focus for contractarians is thus
on private ordering, making freedom of contract essential, and
limiting governmental intervention to enforcing private contacts. 56
An important implication of viewing the corporation as a “nexus
of contracts” is that wealth maximization is the guiding norm of the
corporation. Contractarians assume that wealth maximization is a
“bargained-for term” of the shareholders’ contract with the
corporation. 57As one contractarian observed, shareholders will only
provide equity capital to a corporation if “the directors are charged
with managing the corporation so as to maximize shareholder
wealth.” 58 Contractarians also presume that other stakeholders
similarly enter into voluntary bargains with the corporation, and they
protect their interests by adjusting the contract price to account for
the fact that corporate managers will not give primacy to
their interests. 59
The problems with contractarianism arise principally because of
its assumption of perfect market conditions under which the
supposed voluntary bargaining between affected parties takes place.
In truth, information asymmetries, unanticipated consequences,
inequalities in bargaining power, ambiguities, and complexities may
undercut the actual bargaining process that takes place between
54. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1416, 1426 (1989).
55. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 27 (2002).
56. For a good overview of this argument, see Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and
the Securities Laws: Opting Out of Securities Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 519, 526 (1999).
57. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 3, 6–39, 92–93 (1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 577–87 (2003).
58. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 55, at 58; David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate
Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 3
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
59. Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense Of The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm:
A Reply To Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1443 (1993).
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affected parties. 60 For example, communities “contracting” with a
corporation to establish a branch or plant in its area may not be able
to engage in an efficient bargain with the corporation because they
cannot accurately anticipate the project’s unforeseen contingencies
or do not fully understand its complexities. 61
Contractarians also fail to give considerable weight to the
externalities that can be imposed on third parties because of
contracts made between the corporation and a stakeholder. Thus, a
contract between employees and the corporation to have a factory
continue to operate despite significant safety problems fails to
consider the externalities that will be imposed on the surrounding
community if the factory’s safety problems spill over its four walls.
The communities surrounding the Deepwater Platform in the BP oil
spill or the city of Bhopal after the Union Carbide factory
explosion, 62 for example, are unlikely to have bargained to be a party
to the externalities eventually imposed upon them.
Moreover, while the wealth maximization mantra of a
contractarian corporation prizes, and may maximize, the economic
efficiency of corporations, 63 it does so only in terms of the
corporation’s status in the present. By choosing interests that favor
wealth maximization over stakeholder interests, corporate managers
may, in many instances, be making decisions within a temporal limit.
Hedgefunds, for instance, are well-known for their ability to push
corporate managers to make wealth-maximizing decisions in the
short-run. 64 A strict wealth maximization guiding norm therefore
60. Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate Governance in a Global.
Environment: The Search for the Best of All Worlds, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 829, 836
(2000); Christoph Loch & Svenja Sommer, Incomplete Incentive Contracts Under Ambiguity
and Complexity, 1 (INSEAD Working Paper Series, 2003/72/TM, 2003), available at
http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=1305.
61. Loch and Sommer characterize ambiguities in contracts as the impossibility to
recognize all influence variables and to foresee all possible events, and complexity as the
difficulty to estimate the overall performance because of the interaction of many performance
influence variables. Loch & Sommer, supra note 60, at 1.
62. For an overview of the Bhopal disaster, see 1984: Hundreds Die in Bhopal Chemical
Accident, BBC NEWS (Dec. 3, 1984), http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/
stories/december/3/newsid_2698000/2698709.stm.
63. Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder
Primacy, 31 J. OF CORP. L. 637, 656 (2006); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 57 at 38.
64. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PENN L. REV. 1021, 1083 (2007) (observing “hedge funds come
close to being the archetypal short-term investor”); Battling for Corporate America,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006, available at http://www.economist.com/node/5601741
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forces corporate managers to consider only the immediate impacts of
their decision, potentially constraining their ability to consider the
long-term interests of the firm. Adoption of a contractarian view of
corporations, and its ingrained wealth maximization norm, therefore
can impede the long-term viability of the firm. 65 In particular, a
community in which a corporation operates that emphasizes shortterm decision-making driven exclusively by wealth generation can be
compromised in terms of its sustainability. 66
However, even if managers adopt a long-term view of a wealth
maximization norm, a number of problems persist. Most notably,
although contractarians argue that wealth maximization will serve to
further the interests of stakeholders by creating “a larger pie” from
which stakeholders can take a larger serving,67 this notion is not
supported by empirical evidence. Rather studies demonstrate that gains
to shareholders are often a result of wealth transfers from other
stakeholders.68 Thus, an exclusive wealth maximization norm, even if
adopted on a long-run view, neither necessarily furthers the interests of

(arguing that if rampaging shareholders scared bosses into short-term decisions, their
companies would fail to make potentially crucial long-term investments).
65. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between
Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., 11 (Dec. 2006),
available at http://www.salesforcefoundation.org/files/HBR-CompetiveAdvAndCSR.pdf.
66. Sustainability entails a community being able to meet the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. See U.N.
WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987).
67. Ronald Chen & Jon Hansen, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1124 (2004) (for shareholders,
legal economists focus on maximizing the size of the pie, a theoretical focus that is said to
maximize the pie for all constituencies); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L.
REV. 223, 241 (1991) (One could safely assume that corporate profitability would benefit
nonshareholders as well as shareholders. Especially in times of general prosperity, larger pies
imply larger servings for all.).
68. See, e.g., Andrei Schliefer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile
Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan J. Auerbach
ed. 1988). See also RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, 610 (2d ed. 1995); Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas,
Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate
Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219, 234 (2009).
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the community or other corporate stakeholders and may result in little
or no overall efficiency gains. 69
At the same time, contractarianism offers some advantages. For
one, it facilitates corporate decision-making. Because corporate
managers are driven only by a need to maximize wealth, there is no
need to take into account the multiple interests of a variety of
stakeholders. Corporate managers, therefore, do not have to weigh
shareholder interests against stakeholder interests; do not have to
determine whether shareholder or stakeholder’s interests should
prevail if they conflict; and do not decide which of the variety of
stakeholder interests should prevail if the interests between
stakeholders and themselves conflict.
Second, a contractarian view of corporations can reduce agency
costs. 70 As Bainbridge argues, a wealth maximization norm ensures
that corporate managers do not pursue their “own self-interest by
playing shareholders off against non-shareholders.” 71
Third, contractarianism offers an easier standard by which to
ascertain the effectiveness of corporate decision-making. Assessing
whether a corporation has increased its wealth is easily determined by
examining objective numerical data. In comparison, since there is no
common standard by which to assess whether a corporation has
furthered the interests of the environment or society, determining
whether corporate decision-making has been effective in these areas
remains speculative and prone to manipulation. 72
Finally, adhering to an exclusive wealth maximization norm
enables corporate managers to focus on the generation of profits. If
in so doing it does not generate externalities or result in perpetual
wealth transfers from stakeholders to shareholders, continual profit
69. See generally Schliefer & Summers, supra note 68. The authors argue that
shareholder gains in takeovers often come at the expense of employees’ employment and wage
losses, meaning that net gains to society from a takeover may be small or non-existent.
70. Agency costs relate to divergences of interest between the principal and the agent
and are the sum of the contracting cost, the principal’s monitoring cost (the cost to monitor
the agent), the bonding cost by the agent (payments to the agent to protect against the agent’s
deviations from the principal’s interest), and residual loss (reduction in principal’s welfare due
to divergences). See MICHAEL C. JENSEN AND WILLIAM H. MECKLING, THEORY OF THE
FIRM: MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR, AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 5–6 (1976).
71. Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 1427, 1435, 1438. See also EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 38; Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and
Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001).
72. Pascual Berrone & Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, The Pros and Cons of Rewarding Social
Responsibility at the Top, 48:6 HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT. 959, 965 (2009).
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B. Stakeholder Theory
While contractarians argue that shareholder interests should
prevail over all other interests, stakeholder theorists contend that
corporate managers should consider not only the interests of
shareholders, but also the interests of a variety of corporate
constituents, the so-called stakeholders. The reasons for this
conclusion are varied, and unlike contractarianism, do not draw from
a unified theory.
Consideration of stakeholder interests is, for instance, justified by
viewing the corporation as a social or public institution, 73 as an entity
capable of doing both good and harm,74 or as a moral organism. 75
Alternatively, commentators argue that stakeholder interests should
factor into corporate decision-making because stakeholders are
constituent elements of the overall corporation,76 because of the need
to maximize social welfare, 77 because otherwise shareholders can inflict
harms on stakeholders,78 or because the “legal, economic, political and
moral challenges” to the current nexus of contracts view of the firm
require it.79 The need for corporate managers to consider stakeholder

73. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 46 (2d ed. 1968); Thomas Lee Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract
(And Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273, 309 (1991); David K. Millon,
New Directions in Corporate Law Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate
Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1379 (1993).
74. Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in
Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9,
41–47 (1999).
75. William Bradford, Beyond Good and Evil: The Commensurability of Corporate Profits
and Human Rights, 26 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 141, 148 (2012).
76. Millon, supra note 15, at 525; Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory
Model for Corporate Constituency Concerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1090 (2000).
77. Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043,
1055 (2008).
78. Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders, Changing Metaphors of Corporate
Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1417 (1993).
79. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation, in ETHICAL
THEORY & BUSINESS 39 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E Bowie eds., 6th ed. 2001).
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interests has even been justified under a modified “nexus of contracts”
view of corporations.80
In any case, regardless of the underlying theory justifying
stakeholder theory, stakeholders are unanimous in arriving at three
arguments. First, corporate managers should consider the interests of
stakeholders; second, wealth maximization should not be an
overriding concern guiding corporate decision-making; 81 and third,
corporate managers should balance the interests of all stakeholders,
including shareholders, against each other. 82
The benefits of stakeholder theory, at first glance, appear
overwhelming. Corporations that consider and balance stakeholder
interests in their corporate decision-making are less likely to inflict
externalities on third parties, 83 more likely to foster greater stability
in the economy, 84 more likely to treat others ethically, 85 and are
further inclined to encourage firm-specific investments from
stakeholders and discourage opportunistic behavior. 86 There is
seemingly no disadvantage to creating a means by which
corporations have a greater predisposition to “improve the quality of
people’s lives beyond what they can bargain for.” 87
Contractarians are, however, quick to point out stakeholder
theory’s shortcomings. As Bainbridge argues, adopting a multifiduciary approach to corporate decision-making falls afoul of two
problems that he terms “two masters” and “managerial sins.” The
“two masters” problem arises in situations when it is impossible to
protect non-shareholders from harm without advancing shareholder

80. Blair and Stout reformulate the nexus of contracts theory to argue that a
corporation is a “nexus of firm-specific investments.” See Blair & Stout, supra note 26, at 275,
285. Without arguing per se in favor of promoting the interests of stakeholders, Blair and
Stout’s Team Production theory concludes that corporate managers must consider the interests
of stakeholders who have made firm-specific investments. Id. at 286.
81. John Kaler, Differentiating Stakeholder Theories, 46 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 71, 71
(2003).
82. Blair & Stout, supra note 26 at 281; FREEMAN, supra note 79, at 44; Bradford,
supra note 75, at 149.
83. Green, supra note 78, at 1417.
84. Greenfield, supra note 77, at 1058.
85. Timothy L. Fort, The Corporation as Mediating Institution: An Efficacious Synthesis
of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173 at
176.
86. Blair & Stout, supra note 26, at 271.
87. Millon, supra note 15, at 1389.
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interests. 88 In an “irreconcilable conflict” between shareholder and
non-shareholder interests, stakeholder proponents suggest that
management make trade-offs between the two groups or even
subordinate profit goals in order to further non-shareholder
interests. 89 For Bainbridge, this proposal is problematic as it transfers
wealth from shareholders to non-shareholders and perpetuates the
managerial sins problem. 90
Stakeholder theory critics also argue that the stakeholder
approach further raises problems of agency costs, or what Bainbridge
terms the “managerial sins” problem. The principal critique is that
by releasing corporate managers from a wealth maximization norm,
management can play different corporate constituents off one
another in an effort to pursue their own self-interest. 91 That is,
corporate managers will make decisions that primarily benefit their
own interest and then use any of a myriad of corporate constituents
whose interests are reflected in their decision to justify the decision
taken. 92 As Roe argues, the stakeholder approach “could leave
managers so much discretion that [they] . . . maximize neither
shareholder, employee, consumer, nor national wealth, but only their
own.” 93
Critics charge that stakeholder theory faces a number of
additional shortcomings. These include its failure to assign relative
weights to the interests of the various stakeholders, 94 to devise a
method by which conflicts between shareholders and nonshareholders or between non-shareholders themselves can be
resolved, 95 to offer an operational framework by which corporate
managers can make decisions on a day-to-day basis, 96 and to define
88. Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 1435. See also Fort, supra note 85, at 173, 180.
89. Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 1419, 1435.
90. Id. at 1433.
91. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 581 (1992); Bainbridge, supra note 59,
at 1438; Roe, supra note 71, at 2065.
92. Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 1438 (“When management’s interests coincide with
those of shareholders, management could justify its decision by saying that shareholder
interests prevailed in this instance, and vice-versa.”).
93. Roe, supra note 71, at 2065.
94. THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 45–47 (1989);
Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of Business Ethics:
Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 252 (1994).
95. Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 1435.
96. THOMAS M. JONES, ANDREW C. WICKS & R. EDWARD FREEMAN, Stakeholder
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which individuals are entitled to status as a stakeholder. 97 In
addition, stakeholder theory is further criticized for failing to explain
why the political process, rather than corporate law, is not the more
appropriate venue for preventing firms from generating social costs
or externalities. 98 Enacting environmental, social, or criminal laws
that deter corporate misconduct, critics contend, is the more
“efficient” vehicle for curbing corporate misconduct. 99
C. Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft
As we have seen, contractarianism may promote efficiency,
reduce agency costs, and facilitate corporate decision-making, but
can result in corporate generation of social costs or other
externalities. Conversely, stakeholder theory promotes social welfare
and elevates the interests of stakeholders vis-à-vis shareholders, but
suffers from a well-defined framework to guide corporate decisionmaking and may amplify problems of managerial sins. Parsing
through the “good” and “bad” elements of contractarianism and
stakeholder theory, the aim is now to develop a new model for
corporate governance—in the context of community interests only—
that draws from the benefits of both theories while assuaging
their shortcomings.
1. Developing the Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach
Using the benefits of both contractarianism and stakeholder
theory, developing a model to govern corporate-community

Theory: The State of the Art, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO BUSINESS ETHICS 25
(Norman E. Bowie ed., 2002).
97. George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea Getting Worse, 58 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1107, 1107–08 (2008). See also generally Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note
94, at 252; Dunham et al., supra note 21, at 3.
98. JOHN R. BOATRIGHT, Ethics and Corporate Governance: Justifying the Role of
Shareholder, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 96, at 50, 55; Dent,
supra note 97, at 1112–13 (“If . . . labor markets do not adequately protect, relief should
come directly through changes in employment laws rather than through tinkering with
corporate governance.”); Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 1431. See also Matthew T. Bodie,
NASCAR Green: The Problem of Sustainability in Corporations and Corporate Law, 46 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 491, 520–21 (2011) (arguing that sustainability practices of a corporation are
“peripheral” to corporate law).
99. Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 1431. See also Dent, supra note 97, at 1124
(“Reliance on external forces (i.e., the law) to deter anti-social corporate behavior is likely to
produce a better result than simply instructing directors to act in the public interest.”).
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relations must begin by adopting the advantages either theory can
offer if they further the interests of both shareholders and the
community. For example, neither shareholders nor communities
benefit when agency costs are high. If corporate managers are given
too much latitude, that enables them to prioritize their own interests
over the interests of either shareholders or the community, wealth
transfers from shareholders and the community to corporate
managers become plausible. For this reason, a corporationcommunity governance model must seek to keep agency costs low.
Second, shareholders and the community both benefit when the
firm generates wealth without causing externalities or social costs.
Shareholders benefit through dividends, and the community benefits
through spillovers, like local employment or the firm’s use of local
suppliers. Consequently, the model should seek to preserve the
importance of wealth generation but balance it against the need to
minimize the production of social costs. Nevertheless, because the
model aims to minimize social costs, it may result in instances in
which wealth generation will not be maximized.
Finally, shareholders and the community may both benefit more
when a firm ex ante prevents corporate misconduct. Ex ante
approaches obviously prevent a community from having to suffer the
consequences of corporate misconduct while in some cases,
shareholders may benefit when the costs arising from correction—
such as reputational costs, costs arising from project delays and
disruptions, and costs arising from successful lawsuits emanating out
of the misconduct—are greater than the costs to prevent them. 100
Accordingly, a model governing corporate-community relations
should seek to anticipate and proactively resolve potential sources of
corporate abuse directed at the community.
What this leaves us with is a corporate governance model that
does not wholly abandon the wealth maximization norm espoused
by contractarians, but seeks to reduce the social costs that
corporations can generate that concern stakeholder theorists. In
some ways, it adopts the model of corporate constituency statutes,
which arguably permits corporate managers during a takeover “to
select a plan that is second-best from the shareholders’ perspective,”

100. See Martin Petrin, Assessing Delaware’s Oversight Jurisprudence: A Policy and Theory
Perspective, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 433, 463 (2011); HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN,
THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLES: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT 92 (2006).
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but which enhances the welfare of one or more of the firm’s
stakeholders. 101 However, the model goes further in that its
applicability is not limited to instances of takeovers, and more
importantly, it seeks to balance wealth maximization norms against
community interest enhancement under a business-led approach that
also prizes a community’s sustainability.
The thrust of this model is that the relationship between a
corporation and a community should be viewed symbiotically,
enabling both the corporation and the community to benefit in a
multitude of ways. Under this approach then, corporations should
invest in their operating communities by leveraging activities integral
to their business operations in an effort to achieve sustainable social
gains and improve the business environment in which
they operate. 102
More specifically, a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach to
corporate decision-making is based on corporate strategy, not
philanthropy. Accordingly, corporate decision-making under this
model is guided by two factors. First, corporations should primarily
focus on investments in the community where they can extract
benefits that improve their operating environment. 103 In doing so, a
corporation aligns economic and social goals, thereby improving
both its long-term business prospects and the sustainability of the
community investment. As the World Bank has found, linking
investments in the community to business needs results in greater
internal support and resources from management and shareholders,
more efficient coordination with other business units enabling easier
management of issues that can impact the company-community
relationship, community investments with well-defined objectives
and with a clear direction and purpose, and greater resilience of the
101. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP.
L. REV. 971, 994–95 (1992). Nevertheless, Bainbridge argues managers that select a second
best plan for shareholders must demonstrate that their acts were “in the exercise of the utmost
good faith.” Id. at 995–96.
102. Compare this model with leading models of strategic community investment. See,
e.g., Shilpi Somaya, Non-Philanthropic Corporate Involvement in Community Development, 97
BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 32 (1996); Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive
Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2002, at 56; John A. Pearce II
& Jonathan Doh, The High Impact of Collaborative Social Initiatives, 46 MIT SLOAN MGMT.
REV. 29 (2005).
103. A business’ operating environment includes but is not limited to access to labor,
capital, infrastructure, natural resources, land, related and supporting industries, and
customers.
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investment during budget cuts. 104 Moreover, because the approach is
business-led, or aligned with the corporation’s business performance
and goals, there is less inclination for the corporation to simply
provide handouts to the community, which is not sustainable in the
long run. 105
A business-led approach to investing in a community, however,
limits the breadth of a corporation’s community investment
endeavors. While this may appear, at first glance, to be beneficial
only to shareholder interests, it also ensures that corporations are less
likely to engage in community investment in an overly paternalistic
manner or in a manner that assumes too extensive of a state role.
Unlike governments, corporations may simply be ill-equipped to
engage in all types of community investment programs. Tying their
community investments to their business interests ensures that they
foster community interests that meet their capabilities. 106
Second, corporations should primarily engage in enhancing those
community interests that leverage their core capabilities. While
supporting worthwhile causes that have no relationship to the
business is commendable, corporations that leverage their core
capabilities engage in more efficient and better managed community
investments. 107 Contributing areas of strength in which companies
have specialized expertise or a comparative advantage further ensures

104. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, STRATEGIC COMMUNITY INVESTMENT:
A GOOD PRACTICE HANDBOOK FOR COMPANIES DOING BUSINESS IN EMERGING MARKETS
13 (2010) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION].
105. Id. at iv (providing free goods and services creates dependency and a sense of
entitlement from which companies find it hard to extricate themselves during times of
economic contraction or at project end).
106. See generally Thomas E. Cavanagh, Corporate Community Development: Meeting the
Measurement Challenge, in THE CONFERENCE BOARD—RESEARCH REPORT R-1310-02-RR
(2002); John Rolfe, Galina Ivanova & Stewart Lockie, Assessing the Social and Economic
Impacts of Coal Mining on Communities in the Bowen Basin: Summary and Recommendation,
in SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT TO REDUCE
CONFLICT OVER MINE OPERATIONS RES. REP. NO. 11 (2006); Deanna Kemp, Richard Boele
& David Brereton, Community Relations Management Systems in the Minerals Industry:
Combining Conventional and Stakeholder-Driven Approaches, 9 INT’L. J. SUSTAINABLE DEV.
390 (2006); David Humphreys, A Business Perspective on Community Relations in Mining, 26
RESOURCES POL’Y. 127 (2000).
107. Porter & Kramer, supra note 102, at 59; INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION,
supra note 104, at 21; Pearce & Doh, supra note 102, at 34. A corporation’s core capabilities
may encompass its areas of expertise, where it boasts a comparative advantage, or products or
services that are based on expertise used in, or generated by, their normal operations. See
Pearce & Doh, supra note 102, at 34.
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that corporations have sufficient expertise to address the social
problems raised by the community 108 and can facilitate adoption of
these types of programs into a corporation’s overall strategic
planning. 109 In effect, by harnessing the corporation’s “comparative
advantage” over other actors, including in some cases governments,
corporations can offer value to the community that extends beyond
just money. 110 For example, British Petroleum used its cost and
technical advantages over local governments in providing solarpowered refrigerators to store anti-malaria vaccines in Zambia. 111
Corporations that leverage their core capabilities can, in addition
to maximizing gains to the community, minimize their own costs
and diversions. 112 Thus, J.P. Morgan, using its core competence of
structuring and financing projects, managed low-interest loans for
community projects using only a few new resources. 113 Centering
corporate-community interest alignment around core capabilities
therefore furthers both economic and community goals.
Finally, although a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach is
business-led, it also seeks to foster a community’s sustainable
development, 114 with the aim that the effects of the corporate activity
are expected to survive beyond the corporation’s exit. Consequently,
in order to offer meaningful gains to communities, corporations
should strive to enhance those aspects of the community that will
have a lasting impact. The goal here is to move away from the typical
corporation-community model’s approach to fostering community
interests as a mere public relations tool 115 to one in which corporate
and community interests are meaningfully improved. Thus, if
corporations identify multiple areas in which their interests align with
108. As a community’s social problems have traditionally been administered by the state,
in many cases, a corporation may simply not have sufficient expertise to properly address the
issue. See generally Somaya, supra note 102; Cavanagh, supra note 106; Rolfe et al., supra note
106; Kemp et al., supra note 106.
109. David Hess et al., The Next Wave of Corporate Community Initiatives: Corporate
Social Initiatives, 44 CAL. MGMT. REV. 110, 112 (2002).
110. Id. at 113, 116 (“Social programs based on a firm’s core competencies means that it
may be one of only a few firms (or perhaps the only firm) capable of providing such aid.”).
111. Id. at 116.
112. Pearce & Doh, supra note 102, at 34.
113. Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 37–44.
114. The United Nations defines sustainable development as being able to meet the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs: U.N. WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., supra note 66.
115. See, e.g., Kapelus, supra note 23, at 291.

281

DO NOT DELETE

7/14/2014 3:47 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2014

community interests, they should prioritize those areas in which their
actions will contribute to a community’s sustainable development.
Corporations will, therefore, have to make tradeoffs between
corporate and community interests on a continuum. That is, the
more a decision enhances a corporation’s operating environment and
the more it results in a sustainable community investment, which
draws from the corporation’s core capabilities, the greater priority a
corporation should accord to this activity. Table 1 depicts this
continuum and offers a decision-matrix.
Table 1- Decision Matrix—Continuum of Community and
Corporate Interests 116

Enhancement of
Corporation’s
Operating Environment

Medium
Priority

High
Priority

High
Priority

Low
Priority

Medium
Priority

High
Priority

Low
Priority

Low
Priority

Medium
Priority

Sustainable Impact on Community

Drawing from the decision matrix, we see that activities that land
on the higher end of the continuum for improvements to both the
corporation’s operating environment and the sustainable impact on
community are accorded the highest priority. Medium priority is
then accorded to activities that result in maximum improvements to
either corporate or community interests while simultaneously
resulting in low improvements to the contrary interest or where both
interests are only somewhat improved. Finally, low to medium
improvements to both corporate and community interests are
accorded the lowest priority.
The aim of this mode of decision-making is to move away from a
notion where pursuing community interests is seen as a transfer of
wealth from shareholders to the community and pursuing

116. This matrix draws in part from van Huijstee and Glasbergen’s issue matrix for topics
of dialogue selection between corporations and stakeholders. See Mariëtte van Huijstee &
Pieter Glasbergen, The Practice of Stakeholder Dialogue Between Multinationals and NGOs, 15
CORP. SOC. RESP. ENV’T. MGMT. 298, 303 (2008).
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shareholder interests is viewed as a transfer of wealth from the
community to shareholders. Instead, the goal of this decisionmaking model is to proceed under the view that the risks inherent in
corporate decision-making should be shared between shareholders
and the community.
Implicit in the decision-matrix is also the idea that corporate
decisions that improve a corporation’s operating environment, but
which result in a negative effect on the sustainable development of
the community, should not be undertaken. As the premise of this
model is a symbiotic view of corporations and communities, a
corporate act that imposes high social costs on the community
undercuts the base notion of the model. Corporate imposition of
externalities onto the community is therefore antithetical to a
Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach. While shareholders beholden to
a strict notion of short-term wealth maximization may be reluctant
to embrace this idea, the approach is premised on the idea that in the
small number of cases of a true conflict between profits and a
diminishment of a community’s sustainable development, the longterm viability of the firm and the interests of the community demand
that the generation of short-term profits should not be prioritized. 117
2. Contractarian or stakeholder?
Neither wholly contractarian nor wholly an advocate of
stakeholder theory, a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach to decisionmaking therefore hovers between the two dominant models. While it
seeks to adopt some aspects of each model, it is reluctant to fully
embrace either.
In terms of the contractarian model, a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft
approach adopts, in part, and also departs from the notion of wealth
maximization that underlies contractarianism. For contractarians,
wealth maximization is the guiding norm of corporate decisionmaking; if in so doing, the interests of non-shareholders are served,
this is a by-product of the overarching norm. 118 Accordingly, under a
117. For examples of where companies have foregone short-term profits to promote a
community’s sustainable development and benefitted in the long-run from this decision, see
the case studies in Part III(C)(1).
118. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 600 (2003) (“[I]f the board considers the interests of
non-shareholder constituencies when making decisions, it does so only because shareholder
wealth will be maximized in the long-run.”). See also Kaler, supra note 81, at 78.
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strict contractarian approach, serving non-shareholder interests
should be done to the minimum extent possible. In contrast, under
the approach proposed here, serving community interests is not a byproduct, but an overarching complementary aim. While this means
that corporate managers will still have to make trade-offs between
wealth maximization and community interests, the trade-offs will not
result in a zero sum game between the two interests. Instead,
corporate managers will need to choose corporate actions that
foster—but likely do not maximize—wealth generation as well as
foster community interests. Still, since business considerations will
dictate which of the numerous community interests the corporation
should serve, the model should not increase agency costs. In
addition, unlike contractarianism, in the case of a true conflict
between economic and community interests, economic interests will
not necessarily prevail as the model disavows corporate acts that
impede a community’s sustainable development.
The model also adopts, in part, and again departs from
stakeholder theory. While it embraces the notion of serving the
interests of more than just shareholders and seeks to minimize the
harms that concern stakeholder theorists, it is reluctant to put
shareholders on an equal footing with other stakeholders, in this case
the community. This is because a business-led approach improves the
relevance, sustainability, and effectiveness of the corporation’s ability
to promote community interests. 119 It also does not view trade-offs
between economic and community interests as zero-sum games, but
rather as integral to the long-run sustainability of both the
corporation and the community. Indeed, the focus of this model is
on the ways in which the community’s interests can be encompassed
into the corporation’s interests. The ultimate goal is thus to view the
community’s interest as the corporation’s (and, consequently, the
shareholders’) interest.
In effect, the Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft model is based on the
notion that corporate investment in the community is desirable

119. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, supra note 104, at 13. See also Bryan
W. Husted, Governance Choices for Corporate Social Responsibility: To Contribute, Collaborate
or Internalise?, 36 LONG RANGE PLANNING 481, 491 (2003) (“CSR activities in areas closely
related to the core business of the firm are usually internalized because of the greater
competence of the firm and consequent increased ability to evaluate the decisions and activities
of recipients.”); Somaya, supra note 102, at 32 (Strategic involvement is often more
congruent, enduring, . . . and has greater long-term effects on the community).
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because “the company is part of the community where the
investment is being made. Returns on the investment are . . . seen as
a public good that benefits the company by making its . . .
community a more desirable place to live and work.” 120
III. ALIGNING CORPORATE-COMMUNITY INTERESTS THROUGH
IDENTIFICATION
As we have seen, a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach seeks to
foster benefits for both the corporation and the community by
aligning corporate and community interests. However, the approach
is only viable if the corporation can correctly identify the
community’s interests. If it aligns its actions with interests that do
not reflect the interest of the community, it has not furthered the
community’s sustainable development. In that scenario, it may be
better off simply pursuing a wealth maximization norm. Accurate
community interest identification is, therefore, a critical first step to
the success of a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach.
While a corporation is likely clear on its own interests, it may not
have a thorough understanding of the community’s interests. As
critics have observed, a business-led approach to strategic community
investment can be “self-serving,” “corporate-centric,” and fail to
include the participation or engagement of the community. 121
This type of approach, which often “assumes that the pursuit of
competitive advantage automatically leads to better social
development,” is premised on exploiting the community for the
corporation’s benefit, and may effectively be a public relations
program. 122 Meaningful pursuit of the community’s interests is thus
not necessarily served under a traditional business-led approach.
One way for a corporation to meaningfully ascertain a
community’s interests is to have the corporation “identify” with the
operating community, through a process known as “social
identification.” Social identity theorists argue that when an
individual identifies with a group it facilitates goal integration and

120. Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 4.
121. Judy N. Muthuri, Participation and Accountability in Corporate Community
Involvement Programmes: A Research Agenda, 43COMM. DEV. J. 177, 184 (2008); Diana
Klein & Ulrike Joras, Natural Resources and Peacebuilding: The Role of the Private Sector, 42
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10511, 10515 (2012).
122. Muthuri, supra note 121, at 184; Kapelus, supra note 23, at 291.

285

DO NOT DELETE

7/14/2014 3:47 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2014

congruence between the individual and a group. 123 Although they
acknowledge that individual identification with a group may be only
partial or a matter of degree, 124 they contend that it is the process of
social identification that gives rise to the individual’s perception of
“oneness” with the group. In turn, this enables the individual to
conceptualize or commit to the culture, values, or norms of
the group.
Drawing from social identity theory, we can thus see that if a
corporation identifies, even partially, with the operating community,
it is better placed to comprehend, support, and adhere to the norms,
values, and culture of the community. Aligning corporate and
community interests then becomes less of a matter of assuming
improvements to the community through pursuit of a competitive
advantage strategy and more of an effort to further the interests of
the community because the corporation views itself as intertwined
with the fate of the community.
In the next section, we examine case studies in which
corporations have attempted to “identify” with their operating
communities and assess the benefits and disadvantages stemming
from this approach. However, before proceeding to the case studies,
the following section provides a brief background on the mechanics
of social identity theory.
A. An Overview of Social Identity Theory
Social identity theory is a social-psychological perspective on how
individuals identify with particular groups. According to social
identity theory, people tend to classify themselves and others into
various social categories as a means of ordering their social
environment and in order to locate or define themselves in the social
environment. 125 Social identification is the means by which an
individual can partially answer the question: Who am I? 126

123. Blake E. Ashforth & Fred Mael, Social Identity Theory and the Organization, 14
ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 20, 26 (1989) (arguing that goal commitment and internalization is a
consequence of social identification). See also Douglas T. Hall et al., Personal Factors in
Organizational Identification, 15 ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 176, 176–77 (1970).
124. Ashforth & Mael, supra note 123, at 21.
125. See generally Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup
Behavior, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 7 (William G. Austin & Stephen
Worchel, eds., 2d ed., 1985).
126. See generally, Sheldon Stryker & Richard T. Serpe, Commitment, Identity Salience,

286

DO NOT DELETE

257

7/14/2014 3:47 PM

Aligning Corporate and Community Interests

Identification can occur despite any effort by the individual to
further the group’s goals. Indeed identification begins once the
individual perceives himself as being “psychologically intertwined
with the fate of the group.” 127 For this reason, when an individual
has identified with a group, he will vicariously partake in the
successes and status of the group. 128
Social identification, however, is a matter of degree. As most
individuals can categorize themselves into multiple groups (e.g.,
American, father, attorney. . .), the extent of identification with each
group will vary and may be dependent on the extent to which the
individual values the group’s persona. 129 Nevertheless, regardless of
the degree of identification, identification with a group will enhance
an individual’s support and commitment to the group. Identification
also fosters a positive view of the group and may “engender
internationalization of, and adherence to, group values
and norms.” 130
The process of social identification occurs primarily through
interactions. Interactions between the individual and group can be
verbal or non-verbal (e.g. through symbols or images), may involve
interpreting the responses of others in certain social interactions, or
can result from immersing the individual in the social milieu of the
group. 131 Identification may also arise through reification. 132 That is,
regard for individuals in the group may be generalized to the group

and Role Behavior: Theory And Research Example, in PERSONALITY, ROLES, AND SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR 199 (William J. Ickes & Eric S. Knowles eds., 1982); John C. Turner, Towards A
Cognitive Redefinition of The Social Group, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP
RELATIONS 15 (Henri Tajfel ed., 2010).
127. Ashforth & Mael, supra note 123, at 21.
128. Id. at 22.
129. Id. at 21.
130. Id. at 26.
131. Id. at 27. See alsoJohn Van Maanen, The Self, the Situation, and the Rules of
Interpersonal Relations,in ESSAYS IN INTERPERSONAL DYNAMICS 43 (W. Bennis et al. eds.,
1979); Howard S. Becker & James W. Carper, The Development of Identification with an
Occupation, 61 AM. J. OF SOC. 289 (1956).
132. Ashforth & Mael, supra note 123, at 28. See also John C. Turner, Social
identification and Psychological Group Formation, in THE SOCIAL DIMENSION: EUROPEAN
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2, 518 (Henri Tajfel et al. eds., 1984).
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itself. 133 In addition, socialization and social cues develop an
individual’s identities or reinforce them. 134
B. Framework for Applying Social Identity Theory to Corporations
Social identity theory suggests a unique approach to aligning
corporate and community interests. Encouraging a corporation to
identify with its community, even if only partially, facilitates the
corporation’s support and commitment to the community’s
interests, and is more likely to foster an interest in adhering to the
community’s values and norms.
Still, there may be reason to be skeptical about the applicability
of a social psychological theory focusing on individual behavior to
corporations. Because social identity theory focuses on defining an
individual’s perception of himself or herself within a group, it may be
difficult to comprehend how it could be equally applicable to
corporations, which are nothing more than legal entities, and which
lack the human ability of self-perception.
However, behind the legal artifice, corporations are simply
composites of individuals. It is individuals who work for, organize,
operate, and manage the corporation. It is also these same
individuals who possess the ability to define themselves in a group
setting, thereby enabling the application of social identity theory.
Moreover, it is these individuals, acting behind the legal artifice
of the corporation, who have now begun to spend considerable
effort in creating separate identities for corporations. 135 For instance,
well-known corporate identities include Johnson & Johnson, which
is known as “the caring company,” and Apple Inc., which is known
as the innovative company. Indeed, defining a corporate identity is
akin to the practice of defining oneself under social identity theory.
Whereas under social identity theory, an individual will answer the
question “Who am I?”, in defining a corporate identity, the

133. Ashforth & Mael, supra note 123, at 28. See also generally BERNARD M. BAS,
LEADERSHIP AND PERFORMANCE BEYOND EXPECTATIONS (1985).
134. Kay Deaux, Social Identity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN AND GENDER, VOLUMES
ONE AND TWO 7, 9 (Judith Worell ed., 2001).
135. See generally Stuart Albert & David. A. Whetten, Organizational Identity,in
RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR (L. L. Cummings & Barry M. Staw eds., 1985);
T.C. Melewar & Elizabeth Jenkins, Defining the Corporate Identity Construct, 5 CORP.
REPUTATION REV. 76 (2002).
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organization will answer the question, “Who are we (as an
organization)?” 136
Nevertheless, while the identity of the individual defining himself
or herself in a social situation is clear, it is less clear who is
responsible for defining an identity in the corporate context.
Similarly, in applying social identity theory to corporations in the
community context, it is unclear who the actors are behind the
corporation’s identification with the community. Identification by a
corporate actor with the community can theoretically occur at any
organization level. An employee is as likely to be drawn to a
community’s interests as a manager or director would be. Yet, not all
of the corporate actors are equally placed to understand the interests
of the corporation such that any proposed alignment of corporate
and community interests will be meaningful.
For this reason, corporate identification with the interests of the
community must resonate at the board level. As the ultimate
decision-makers of the firm, the board enjoys wide discretion to take
into account and make trade-offs between different corporate
constituents. 137 Accordingly, a board that has identified with its
operating community is better placed to understand the trade-offs
between shareholder and community interests that are needed to
foster alignment of corporate and community interests. Thus,
identification works best when the board itself interacts with the
community or delegates the interactions to a manager or employee.
In other words, while identification can move up the organizational
hierarchy from an employee to board level or down from the board
to employees, 138 board ownership of identification with the
community remains imperative.

136. Albert & Whetten, supra note 135, at 263.
137. Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:
THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 56 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985)
(noting “the board of directors is the ultimate decision-making body of the corporation (and
in a sense is the group most appropriately identified with ‘the corporation’)”); Blair & Stout,
supra note 26, at 291 (arguing “directors [have] tremendous discretion to sacrifice
shareholders’ interests in favor of . . . deciding what is best for ‘the firm’”).
138. Interactions with the community that begin below board level must eventually be
transmitted to the board and the board must “buy-in” to the importance of these interactions
with the community before identification with the community can occur.
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C. Examples of Corporate Identification
Despite the benefits of corporate identification with their
operating communities, requiring interactions between corporations
and communities has not traditionally been an important aspect of
the corporate-community relationship. As the president of a
community association observed in connection with the arrival of a
multinational company into his community: the company acts
“without consulting us, acting as if everything belongs to them . . . .”139
Even those scholars who advocate corporate consideration of
community interests fail to acknowledge the need for corporations to
interact with their operating communities. 140 Instead, these scholars
acknowledge corporate hegemony and the “unbalanced” corporatecommunity relationships that derive from that attribute, but assume
that unilateral corporate decisions to invest in the community will
automatically benefit the community. 141
The failure of corporations to interact with their operating
communities is somewhat surprising as there is considerable support
for the notion that dialogue between parties is essential to problem
solving. For example, a proactive dialogue in which dilemmas are
openly shared has been found “to stimulate a mutual learning
process that spurs creativity and innovation,” 142 to be important for
detecting and deriving solutions to complex business-related
sustainability problems, and to be essential to managing risk related
to stakeholders and integral for gaining a competitive advantage on
stakeholder-related issues. 143
Perhaps with the benefits of dialogue in mind, a small but
increasing group of corporations are seeking to identify, through
interactions, with their operating communities. In some instances
these are corporations that previously had combative relationships
with their community. As one corporation admits, its past

139. Paulo Flávio Machado, President of the Barra do Riacho Community Association as
cited in ARACRUZ CELULOSE—2008 ANNUAL AND SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 34 (2008),
available
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/system/attachments/514/original/
COP.pdf?1262614196.
140. See, e.g., Muthuri’s criticisms of the dominant community investment models.
Muthuri, supra note 121, at 184.
141. Id.
142. van Huijstee & Glasbergen, supra note 116, at 300.
143. Id.
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community relationships were ones in which “polarization and
paternalization prevailed.” 144 Yet the modern approach of these
corporations is to emphasize engagement with the community.
Three case studies of corporations that have chosen to identify with
their operating communities follow. These include Fibria Celulose in
various communities in Brazil, Royal Dutch and Shell in
communities in southern Philippines, and Cascade Engineering in
Grand Rapids, Michigan.
1. Case studies
Fibria Celulose, a pulp and paper company headquartered in
Brazil, is an example of a corporation that has decided to revise its
approach to community interests after years of acrimonious
relationships with its operating communities. Its new approach is an
engagement model designed to optimize corporate-community
engagement. 145 The model is tripartite in nature and encompasses
dialogue, a participative agenda, and engagement.
In dialogue, the corporation engages in discussions with affected
communities to ascertain its impacts on the communities and to take
action for any negative impacts. The “participative agenda”
component then requires a company representative, chosen through
the regional office, to become acquainted with the people of the
community and become “a constant presence in the community.”
The aim is to have a “physical presence” in the community that will
facilitate the company’s access to the people of the community and
vice-versa. Finally, the model involves engagement in which
corporate discussions with stakeholders bring to light issues of
mutual interest. Engagement is designed to deepen the corporation’s
relationship with the community and establish it as a partner in
local development.
Fibria cites its engagement model as a method by which it
garners a better understanding of the community’s critical issues and
by which it can then take into consideration the community’s issues
in its decision-making process. 146 Some community members seem
144. FIBRIA CELULOSE S.A., SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2010, at 66 (2010), available at
http://www.fibria.com.br/rs2010/en/.
145. FIBRIA, INVESTOR RELATIONS, STRATEGY AND COMPETITIVE STRENGTHS (Mar. 9,
2012),
available
at
http://fibria.infoinvest.com.br/static/enu/estrategia-vantagenscompetitivas.asp?idioma=enu.
146. Id.
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to agree. As one community member notes, “the company is getting
to know our culture better,” 147 while another comments that “our
lives. . . have changed a lot [for the better] since Fibria came here
and settled in our midst.” 148 Moreover, although community
members note that problems between the corporation and the
community persist, they praise the company for being “really . . .
open to listening. [T]hey take the situation, discuss it there, then
come back with a response; we are not left without a response
. . . .” 149 Similar to Fibria, Shell has adopted a greater interest in
community matters as a result of its poor previous community
relationships, such as its previously discussed experience in the Niger
Delta. The Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project 150 in the
Philippines was Shell’s first project under its new approach. Shell’s
aim was to obtain the community’s ex ante consent to its operations.
Two years before project construction began, Shell began the
process to obtain community consent using four strategies. These
included community outreach and interviews with key opinion
leaders and decision makers; information dissemination, education,
and communication activities; perception surveys and participatory
workshops to introduce the project and validate initial survey results;
and participatory involvement in the formulation of environmental
management plans. 151 It also held town hall meetings to hear and
respond to community concerns and public hearings to review the
results of an environmental impact report of the project. 152
Through its interactions with the affected communities, Shell
became aware of the community’s needs and found venues through
which they could allay the community’s concerns about the
environmental impacts of the project. More importantly, once Shell
became aware of the community’s needs, it could directly align its
147. ARACRUZ CELULOSE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2008, at 33 (2008), available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/system/attachments/514/original/COP.pdf?126261419
6. (Aracruz was the predecessor company to Fibria).
148. FIBRIA, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2011, at 92 (2011), available at
http://www.fibria.com.br/rs2011/en/.
149. Id. at 94.
150. The Malampaya project involves the extraction of natural gas from below the seabed
and the transportation of the gas by undersea pipeline to a natural gas refinery plant more than
five hundred kilometers from the extraction site.
151. STEVEN HERZ ET AL., DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT CONFLICT: THE BUSINESS CASE
FOR COMMUNITY CONSENT 21 (2007).
152. Id. at 21
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interests with pertinent community interests. For example, the
community expressed an interest in working for the project, but
most members of the community did not have the necessary skills. 153
Shell, therefore, trained the local residents in skills such as welding
and masonry, and then employed them.
Moreover, once the construction of the project was complete
and Shell no longer needed the workers they had trained, they
retrained the workers in skills such as electronics and animation, and
helped them find employment with other neighboring businesses. 154
Shell also rerouted a pipeline, at three times the initial cost, when it
learned, through meetings with community leaders, that the original
route for the pipeline would impact areas of rich biodiversity or cross
the ancestral waters of one of the indigenous communities. 155
Finally, Shell maintains ongoing community relations by having its
representatives meet monthly with community leaders to provide
updates on project operations and to enable the community to
raise concerns. 156
Corporate identification with the community is not, however,
confined to corporations operating globally. Cascade Engineering, a
plastic injection moldings business based in Grand Rapids, Michigan,
has been identifying with its community for a number of years.
Possessing comparative advantages in manufacturing and inventory
management, Cascade also offers a particular expertise in employee
training. 157 Due to the high level of skill necessary to produce its
product, Cascade has developed a “human capital” program that
offers cutting edge skills training. 158 The program is considered one
of the most comprehensive training programs in the United
States. 159
Due to its experience in human capital development, in the late
1990s, Cascade was approached by local county officials to
participate in a newly formed welfare-to-work program. The
program was designed to move welfare recipients into paid
employment as quickly as possible. Cascade managers were drawn to
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25.
Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 29–30.
Id. at 30.
Id.
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the program as its aims aligned with the general philosophy of
Cascade, which was “to improve and strengthen the community in
which you live.” 160 At the same time, Cascade identified a business
advantage to participating in the program. Since recruitment and
retention efforts from the local labor pool in Grand Rapids were
intensely competitive, the program gave them access to an untapped
pool of labor. 161
After three iterations, the program that Cascade ultimately
developed to recruit and retain welfare workers was based on its preexisting training program, but was modified based on research on
generational poverty. 162 Working with an expert manual, Cascade
introduced programs to combat typical problems of generational
poverty employees. 163 For instance, it identified and worked to
remove barriers to sustained employment, such as lack of childcare
and reliable transportation, and provided an orientation program
that introduced employees to the culture and norms of working
life. 164 Cascade considers the program a success as it is able to retain
on average 97.4% of the ninety candidates it recruits each year. 165 A
past CEO of Cascade attributes the success of the program to
working with the community. “You can’t work on one part of that
system, or it’s just like squeezing a balloon”, he explains. “You
have . . . to look at the whole system and understand it . . . .” 166
2. Assessment
The Fibria, Shell, and Cascade Engineering case studies highlight
both the mechanisms by which corporations can identify with
communities as well as the mutual corporate-community benefits
that identification can garner. In terms of identification, all three of
the corporations relied on two methods: immersion and formalized

160. Id. at 36. As a company representative observes, involving Cascade in the
community will “make Cascade a better company, . . . make society a better place to live in
[and ] . . . help our economy”. Id.
161. Id. at 30.
162. Id. at 31; Jennifer Hu et al., Cascade Engineering: Building Frontline Employee
Programs For Triple Bottom Line Impact, ASPEN INSTITUTE CASE STUDY – LWW-02, at 5–6
(2012).
163. Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 31.
164. Hu et al., supra note 162, at 6–7.
165. Id. at 8.
166. Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 36.
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interaction. Each of the companies, for instance, immersed
themselves in their community by locating their company or a
representative of the company in the operating community. As social
identity theorists have observed, identification will be facilitated
through immersion in a group.
Fibria cites locating a member of its company in the community
as a way for the community to have access to the company, but the
reverse may be equally true. For example, Fibria has been better able
to understand the community’s culture by locating itself within it.
Similarly, one of Cascade’s aims in becoming involved with the
welfare-to-work community was to make the community where both
its company and the workers were located “a better place to live in.”
167
The corporation’s physical proximity to the community was a
basis, thus, for comprehension of the needs of the community and as
a means of increasing its sense of solidarity with the community.
Each of the companies also interacted with the community in a
number of ways. Cascade, for instance, which was not well versed in
the meaning and symbols of the welfare community relied on expert
advice to become familiar with its inner workings and then interacted
with the welfare workers using their own terminology and language.
Conversely, Fibria and Shell initiated a dialogue process with their
communities. Fibria, for instance, organized both dialogue processes
to garner feedback on their projects and engagement processes that
involve discussions to create sustainable corporate-community
projects. Shell, on the other hand, organized town hall meetings and
public hearings in order to enable a broad range of community
members, and not just elites, to voice their opinion on its project.
Indeed, while dialogue processes with communities have often been
prone to manipulation—for example where a corporation “educates”
a community about its project as a public relations exercise—these
companies made concerted efforts to engage in a bidirectional
communication process with the community, which sought to utilize
or act upon their views. 168
Each of the case studies also exemplifies the mutual benefits, to
167. Id.
168. See generally Jane Fiona Cumming, Engaging Stakeholders in Corporate
Accountability Programmes: A Cross-Sectoral Analysis of UK And Transnational Experience,
10:1 BUS. ETHICS: EUR. REV. 45 (2001); Abigail Oxley Green & Lynsey Hunton-Clarke, A
Typology of Stakeholder Participation For Company Environmental Decision-Making, 12:5 BUS.
STRATEGY & ENV’T. 292 (2003).
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both the community and to the corporation, to which corporate
identification with the community can give rise. Fibria, for instance,
has fostered community interests by supporting over seventy
community projects, including using unused portions of the
company’s eucalyptus plantations to run small-scale forestry and
agribusiness projects, running environmental and conservation
education programs in schools, and providing employment skills
workshops. 169 Fostering community interests has also given Fibria a
social license to operate, which reduces the costs of community
opposition to its projects and may enhance its reputation.
Similarly, Cascade’s program benefits the community by offering
meaningful employment to indigent members as well as giving the
company access to a new pool of local labor in a competitive
employment market. 170 In addition, Cascade estimates that its
program has resulted in a five-year cumulative net marginal benefit
of $502,000 and that the community has benefitted at a rate of just
under $900,000 per year, in part from not having to provide
government assistance to each of the recipients of the program. 171
Yet, it is Shell’s Malampaya project that best details the extent of
benefits corporate identification with the community can offer. Shell
made initial investments in the community of $6 million, and it
maintains community interests through annual investments of
approximately $500,000. 172 More importantly, since the community
collaborated on the projects chosen for the investments, the
investments have had both a meaningful impact on the community,
and are sustainable, in that their benefits remain even after Shell’s
exit. 173 For instance, the benefits of rerouting a pipeline to protect
169. FIBRIA SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2010: RELATIONSHIP WITH COMMUNITIES
(2010),
http://www.fibria.com.br/rs2010/en/template?go=social/social_comunidades_
relacionamento.html.
170. As Cascade notes, these are not dead-end burger flipping jobs. The program’s
starting salary is $10/hour, but it offers promotions to these employees as well, meaning that
for some, they will go from welfare to salaries of over $30,000 in two years. Cavanagh, supra
note 106, at 35.
171. James R. Bradley, Bridging the Cultures of Business & Poverty: Welfare to Career at
Cascade Engineering, Inc., STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 80 (Spring 2003), available at
http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/bridging_the_cultures_of_business_and_poverty.
172. HERZ, supra note 151, at 25.
173. The United Nations Environment Program recognized the importance of the
community investments made by Shell by awarding it the World Business Summit Award for
Sustainable Development Partnerships in 2002. See Alejandro R. Roces, Malampaya Gas
Project Wins Int’l Award, PHILIPPINE STAR (Sept. 7, 2002).
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the community’s biodiversity or provision of transferable
employment skills to local residents are not dependent on
Shell’s presence.
However, in addition to fostering community interests, Shell has
been able to further its own economic interests. Shell estimates that
it avoided $50 to $72 million in costs through ex ante community
consent. 174 In particular, obtaining community approval for the
project enabled Shell to avoid construction delays arising from
community opposition to the project and penalty fees that it would
have had to pay to the power plant operators if the gas was not
delivered by the scheduled date. 175 Community consent also enabled
Shell to complete the construction of the project ahead
of schedule. 176
Still, the approaches employed by the corporations are not
without their flaws. Fibria, for example, may not be consistently
employing its engagement model with each of the communities in
which it operates. Thus, in 2010 local non-government
organizations accused Fibria of compromising the way of life of the
Quilombola community through the establishment of eucalyptus
plantations on their lands. 177 Moreover, Fibria still faces problems
with several communities because of the lack of engagement its
predecessor corporation, Aracruz, took in conducting relations with
local communities. 178
Nevertheless despite their shortcomings, the case studies
demonstrate that corporate identification with the community
presents a number of distinct advantages. For the corporation it can
offer legal and social risk minimization, 179 cost avoidance, new
174. HERZ, supra note 151, at 25.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. World Wildlife Federation, Reconciling the Needs of Local People and the Pulp
Industry: A Case Study From Espírito Santo, Brazil, PANDA.ORG (Mar. 30, 2012),
http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/brazilpulppapercasestudy_pdf.pdf.
178. Id.; World Rainforest Movement, Brazil: Aracruz Sows Violence and Destruction in
Espirito Santo, WRM’S BULLETIN NO. 161 (Dec. 2010).
179. Community opposition to corporate activities can manifest itself through lawsuits
aimed at the corporation or physical attacks on the corporation’s infrastructure, operations, or
employees. See Amy K. Lehr & Gare A. Smith, Implementing a Corporate Free, Prior, and
Informed Consent Policy: Benefits and Challenges, FOLEY HOAG 21 (2010) (arguing that
companies’ failure to garner community consent to their operations “can lead to social
unrest . . . decades of conflict and reputation-damaging lawsuits”).
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sources of labor, access to new markets, greater definition to its legal
operating environment, 180 and enhancements to its reputation. It
also avoids developing a paternalistic relationship between the
corporation and the community.
At the same time, it can offer the community sustainable
development, with benefits that continue beyond the exit of the
corporation, and protection of its idiosyncratic interests, such as its
culture or heritage. Moreover, because identification requires
meaningful interactions with the community, this process is less
likely to give rise to a “disingenuous public relations exercise.” 181
Instead, through meaningful interactions with the community, the
case studies demonstrate that substantive changes can be made to
corporate behavior that accommodate or foster the needs of
the community.
Nonetheless, the case studies also evidence that corporate
identification with the community does not necessarily optimize a
corporation’s wealth nor satisfy all of the community’s interests. Still,
it does avoid decision-making being transformed into a zero-sum
game. Even better, it produces a less conflicted and more
harmonious relationship between the corporation and the
community, ultimately leading to mutual gains.
IV. REGULATING THE ALIGNMENT OF CORPORATE AND
COMMUNITY INTERESTS
As we have seen, a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach to
corporate decision-making, by way of corporate identification with
the community, can lead to mutual benefits for the corporation and
the community. Yet as this approach remains the exception and not
the norm for corporate consideration of community interests, ways
by which corporations can be encouraged to take this approach are
considered next. Three methods for encouraging corporate and
community interest alignment are discussed: public regulation, selfregulation, and a hybrid system.

180. Id.
181. This has been a critique of several corporate social responsibility programs. See, e.g.,
John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice
in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 16 (2005).
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A. Public Regulation
One method by which corporations will align their interests with
those of the community is to impose this duty upon them through
enactment of public regulations. For instance, the Philippine
government conditions the granting of environmental licenses to
corporations on the completion of a matrix on community consent.
This requires a corporation to evidence that it has successfully
addressed six areas, 182 ranging from the environmental soundness of
the project to engagement of the public participation process to
promotion of social and intergenerational equity. Specific evidence
the regulation demands includes information about the manner in
which the corporation has consulted with the community and
incorporated their suggestions and/or information pertaining to the
involvement of women or other vulnerable groups into livelihood
programs/projects run in connection with the project. 183
Similarly, the Canadian government requires corporations to
consult with certain indigenous communities prior to the
commencement of major development projects. 184 More specifically,
the Canadian government mandates that corporations negotiate an
“Impact and Benefit Agreement” with the affected communities,
which provides for mitigation of the adverse impacts of the project
and provides benefits to the affected communities. 185 Specific areas
the government suggests should be included as topics of negotiation
include training and preferential hiring for members of the affected
community, protection and conservation of archaeological sites and
specimens, and establishment of a liaison between the community

182. These include: ecological and environmental soundness of the proposed project,
effective implementation of the public participation process, resolution of conflicts, promotion
of social and intergenerational equity and poverty alleviation, and proposed mitigation
measures for adverse impacts and measures for the enhancement of positive impacts on people.
HERZ, supra note 151, at 21–22.
183. Id. See also PHILIPPINES DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, Admin. Order No. 96-37 ORDER TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE
IMPLEMENTATION THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (EIS) SYSTEM (Dec. 2, 1996)
(Phil.).
184. See, e.g., Nanavut Land Claims Agreement Act, R.S.C. 1993, c. 29, art. 26 (Can.).
185. Id.

299

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/14/2014 3:47 PM

2014

and the corporation to facilitate incorporation of the community’s
participation and concerns. 186
Public regulation is primarily designed to exact benefits under a
notion of command and control. The government commands
corporations to consider community interests and controls their
behavior through the threat of negative sanctions. 187 Corporations
are thus legally obligated to follow the minimum standards for
community interest consideration or face sanctions. Both the
regulations used by the Philippine and Canadian governments
exemplify this approach as licenses or permits to operate are denied if
corporations do not meet the specified standards. Public regulation
also enables governments to impose minimum standards for
community interest protection and may enable it to induce greater
degrees of compliance with these standards if the penalties for noncompliance are onerous. 188 Vigilant enforcement of the regulation
further provides consistent levels of corporate compliance over a
period of time. 189
However, public regulation does not necessarily coincide with a
Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach to corporate decision-making. As
public regulations generally employ a top-down approach, they often
fail to take into account the individual circumstances of either the
corporation or the community. 190 Having to adhere to these rules
can therefore disincentivize corporations from developing individual
or unique approaches to considering community interests. 191 It can
also hamper the ability of a corporation to tie its business acumen to
community interests, which as we have seen is one of the strengths of
a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach as it avoids corporate
paternalistic
behavior
and
increases
corporate-community
sustainable relationships. 192
186. Id. at 210, Schedule 26-1.
187. Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False
Dichotomies, 19 L. & POL’Y 529, 534 (1997).
188. Anita I. Anand, Voluntary vs Mandatory Corporate Governance: Towards An
Optimal Regulatory Framework 9 (Am. Law and Econ. Assoc. Annual Meetings, Working
Paper, No. 44, 2005).
189. Sinclair, supra note 187, at 534.
190. See, e.g., Anand, supra note 188, at 16–17; Jennifer Nash, & John Ehrenfeld, Code
Green: Business Adopts Voluntary Environmental Standards, 38 ENV’T.: SCI. & POL’Y FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV., Jan.–Feb. 1996, at 16, 17.
191. Anand, supra note 188, at 16; Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 190, at 17.
192. See supra notes 105–107.
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Public regulations may further impose greater costs on both the
government and corporations. For governments, costs arise from
drafting, implementing, monitoring and enforcing the regulation. In
a time of austerity, these types of costs may be simply prohibitive for
some governments. 193 For corporations, public regulations impose
internal management costs, or the costs of organizing itself to
comply with a legal rule. 194 Thus, under the regulations imposed by
the Philippine government, corporations must first internally
organize themselves in a prescribed manner such that they can report
on the six designated areas in addition to expending the costs of
satisfying community interests.
Public regulations may also suffer from lack of government
expertise or disinterest in promoting community interests.
Implementing quality corporate-community interest regulations may
not be within the expertise of some governments, while other
governments may be disinclined from implementing any regulations
at all. In particular, governments of some developing countries have
been known to be more interested in attracting the capital infusion
of foreign corporations rather than protecting community interests
and may view regulations that mandate community interest
consideration as antithetical to their main goal. 195 In fact, there are
even some governments which make it impossible or illegal to carry
out any engagement processes with affected communities. 196
In short, public regulations mandating corporations to consider
community interests may not further the interests of either the
community or the corporation. While use of public regulations can
allow governments to impose minimum standards of community
193. In fact even the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been faced with a
decreasing budget and an increasing load of mandated responsibilities. In 1996, a former
administrator of the EPA observed that the EPA was not able to meet more than 80 percent of
the environmental standards set by Congress. See Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 190, at 17.
194. Anand, supra note 188, at 13.
195. See, for example, the experience of Manhattan Mining, a U.S. corporation that was
granted a concession contract by the Federal Government of Peru but which failed to dialogue
with the local community. The community was ultimately able to cease the corporation’s
activities in Peru. See Peru |Tambogrande: Manhattan Minerals, supra note 31. Similarly, in
Metalclad, the Federal Government of Mexico granted a license to a U.S. corporation to
operate a hazardous waste facility in a community without the community’s input. The
community opposed the facility and passed an ordinance that ultimately left the corporation
unable to use the site. See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug.
30, 2000) 5 ICSID 212 (2002).
196. Lehr & Smith, supra note 179, at 41.
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interest protection and, if effectively monitored and enforced,
increase corporate compliance with these standards, it also imposes
considerable costs on both the government and corporations.
Moreover, it may impede the development of individually tailored
corporate solutions to the problems and may interfere with corporate
ability to link competitive advantages to community interests. Most
importantly, as many governments fail to prioritize the interests of
the community, public regulations protecting these interests may be
deficient in scope or size or simply not be present at all.
B. Self-Regulation
A second approach to facilitating a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft
approach to corporate decision-making is to have corporations,
independent of government involvement, undertake to develop their
own rules and enforcement mechanisms for considering community
interests. As the case studies have indicated, there are a few
corporations already employing this method. Some companies and
industries are also seeking to develop their own principles for
engaging with the community. 197 For instance, Talisman Energy
Inc., an oil and gas company, recently commissioned a report on
developing practices for community engagement for its projects. 198
There are a number of advantages to self-regulation. For one, selfregulation enables corporations to tailor individualized approaches to
problems, such as using business strengths as a means of fostering
community interests. Self-regulation further enables corporations to act
on their own initiative rather than be coerced into a particular course of
action, and there is a natural tendency to prefer this course of action
over the command and control approach of public regulation.199 This
approach may also result in greater commitment to community interest
protection as self-regulation requires changes from within the
corporation such as management commitment, genuine recognition of
the need to protect community interests, and changes to
corporate policy.200
197. Thus, the Forest Stewardship Council now advises companies to obtain community
consent for forest operations. See FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, supra note 46.
198. See Lehr & Smith, supra note 179.
199. Sinclair, supra note 187, at 534.
200. Alex Wawryk, Regulating Transnational Corporations Through Corporate Codes of
Conduct, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 53, 61 (Jedrzej George
Frynas & Scott Pegg eds., 2003); Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 190, at 17.
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Compared to public regulation, self-regulation is also a less
expensive option for both governments and corporations.
Governments need not incur the costs of drafting, implementing, or
enforcing the regulations and corporations do not incur added
internal management costs. Self-regulation also enables corporations
to align community interests with existing business strengths
meaning that these investments will be achieved at low incremental
costs. In addition, in countries where law enforcement or monitoring
is weak, self-regulation may be more effective than
public regulations. 201
At the same time, corporate self-regulation is meaningless if the
approach adopted does not adequately address at least some
substantive community interest issues or is not diligently enforced or
monitored. 202 For instance, a business-led community engagement
program may foster some short-term community interests but fail to
develop any sustainable investments that last beyond the
corporation’s exit. This will be particularly apparent when decisions
to foster community interests are made using the best interests of the
corporation, not the best interests of the community.
Similarly, without a third-party monitoring or enforcement
mechanism, corporate attention to community interests is left purely
to the goodwill of the corporation. 203 Should it choose not to foster
community interests or do so only in a peripheral manner, it will not
face any sanctions for its non-compliance. Finally, for those
corporations wholly uninterested in furthering community interests,
a self-regulatory program for community interests ensures that they
can continue their status quo.
Self-regulation thus offers the benefits of individualized
solutions, flexibility, greater firm commitment to fostering
community interest protection, lower costs, and an opportunity to
align community interests to business strengths. At the same time,
self-regulation can lead to community investments that are neither
substantive nor sustainable. Even worse, self-regulation will also not
sanction corporations who eventually abandon community interest
considerations or who wholly ignore these interests from the outset.

201. Wawryk, supra note 200, at 61.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 61–62.
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C. A Hybrid Approach
As both public regulation and self-regulation offer a number of
benefits and disadvantages, it is apparent that promoting a
Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach to corporate decision-making for
community interests may need to adopt a hybrid regulatory
approach. Public regulation, for instance, can be used to create an
enabling environment for corporate consideration of community
interests, while self-regulatory practices can be used to allow
corporations to determine how best to meet the principles of the
public regulation.
More specifically, broadly worded regulations that mandate
corporations to both consider and foster community interests should
be promulgated at both the national and the international level. 204
Regulations can further prescribe that the determination of the
interests of the community should be made through a corporatecommunity collaborative process, which requires corporations to
“identify” or engage with all members of the community including
those from marginalized or vulnerable groups.
At the same time, the regulations need not prescribe the
methods by which corporations must consider or foster community
interests or specify the details of the collaborative process. Instead,
the regulations should prescribe a list of non-compulsory best
practices for both activities. These could include elements by which
identification is fostered, such as requiring the corporation to locate
a representative in the local community, as well as guidelines on
establishing an effective dialogue process with the community.
Corporations would then be able to self-determine how they will
comply with the overall principles of the regulation. Finally, to
incentivize corporations to adhere to regulations in this area,
corporations should be required to disclose how and when they have
both considered and fostered community interests as part of their
annual disclosure obligations under domestic securities law. 205

204. While this Article focuses on regulations at the national level, binding regulations
could be introduced at the international level in provisions in bilateral investment treaties or
free trade agreements. For an overview on these agreements, see Barnali Choudhury,
Democratic Implications Arising from the Intersection of Investment Arbitration and Human
Rights, 46 ALTA. L. REV. 983, 985–89 (2009).
205. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2006) (discussing
disclosure obligations for annual reports).
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A hybrid approach to regulating corporate consideration of
community interests is, however, less applicable for those areas where
the potential impact of a corporation’s activities on the community
are irreversible. An example of an irreversible area is a toxic chemical
spill that could lead to a public health crisis reminiscent of the
Bhopal disaster. 206 For these types of community interest areas, the
continuum of regulation from public to self-regulation should lean
more heavily toward public regulation. Public regulations could,
therefore, for pre-determined irreversible areas, condition operating
permits or licenses on ex ante community “consent.” Corporations
would be required to disclose any of their activities that could cause
irreversible harm to the community. The community would then be
able to respond in one of three ways: negotiate ex ante compensation
for this activity; require that the corporation demonstrate how it
intends to minimize the possibility of this activity and the method by
which compensation would be calculated if, despite precautions,
harm still arises; or refuse the corporation permission to conduct this
activity in its community.
Regulating a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach to decisionmaking using a hybrid approach offers several of the benefits
provided by public regulations and self-regulation. Corporations will
not incur high indoor management costs as they can promote
community interests using their established forms of organization.
They can also promote those community interests that align with
their business strengths, benefitting from a synergistic approach. At
the same time, while governments still incur the costs of designing
the regulation, they do not incur any monitoring costs, and
enforcement costs are low as government officials already review
securities documents for this type of information. As a result, no new
enforcement mechanisms are necessary.
Conversely, using public regulations primarily to regulate
community interest areas that can suffer irreversible damage ensures
the protection of these areas regardless of corporate interest in the
matter. While it is more expensive than self-regulation, binding
regulations further ensure that the community plays an active role in
ex ante determining its fate.
Both approaches, however, suffer from three main limitations.
First, as under either approach corporations are not required to
206. For an overview of the Bhopal disaster see supra notes 30 and 62.
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satisfy all community interests, critics may argue that community
interests are not meaningfully addressed. 207 Yet as corporations are
required to “identify” or collaborate with communities to determine
the interests they will foster, it is more likely that by working with
the community, the corporation will choose at least some interests of
significance to the community. Moreover, use of a GesellschaftGemeinschaft approach to decision-making favors, as the decisionmatrix earlier considered indicates, 208 areas that both foster a
community’s sustainable development and enhance a corporation’s
operating environment. Accordingly, choosing to foster issues of
significance to the community is already built into this model.
Second, under the hybrid approach, compliance with this
regulation will likely be induced only if the sanctions for noncompliance are high. The Securities and Exchange Commission
[SEC] has not, however, been particularly vigilant about sanctioning
corporations for failing to adhere to disclosure rules. For instance, in
relation to rules for disclosing diversity policies for board member
nominating committees, the SEC has observed that corporate
compliance with this rule has been “spotty” 209 but has not indicated
that corporations that failed to adhere to the rule will face any
repercussions. A similar approach has been observed for corporations
that failed to adhere to climate change disclosure rules. 210 Still,
despite lax enforcement, disclosure rules requiring corporations to
demonstrate how they have considered and fostered community
interests can offer benefits by way of the expressive function of
law. 211 In particular, by formulating a rule requiring corporations to
207. This limitation may be less relevant for the non-hybrid approach as it is likely that
irreversible areas are meaningful areas of interest for a community. Still, the government may
limit the interests it considers irreversible to only a few areas. If so, this criticism may still
equally hold true for the non-hybrid approach.
208. See Table 1 supra Part II.C.1.
209. Elisse B. Walter, SEC Commissioner, Remarks at the DirectWomen Board Institute
(Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch021011ebw-2.htm (“[T]he
corporate track record for disclosure under this new requirement is quite spotty so far.”).
210. See Suriya Jayanti, Failure to Launch: Insights from The Issuance and NonEnforcement of the Securities And Exchange Commission’s “Commission Guidance Regarding
Disclosure Relating To Climate Change”, in PROC. OF THE 9 INT’L CONF. ON ENVTL.
COMPLIANCE
AND
ENFORCEMENT
275
(2011),
available
at
http://inece.org/conference/9/proceedings/34_Jayanti.pdf; Sarah Johnson, Does the SEC
Care if You’re Green?, CFO.COM (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.cfo.com/articl
e.cfm/14550880.
211. For an overview on the expressive function of law, see Cass R. Sunstein, On the
TH
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engage with communities, law can express the social value of
protecting community interests and can work towards propelling
normative changes in corporate behavior. 212
In addition, for those corporations that do comply with SEC
rules, despite lax enforcement, disclosure rules on community
interest consideration can effect substantive changes in corporate
behavior. 213 One commentator has colorfully described the effect of
disclosure rules on corporate behavior by noting that “if every
instance of adultery had to be disclosed, there would probably be less
adultery.” 214 More specifically, as disclosure rules in this area require
a corporation to analyze in detail—perhaps for the first time—its
practices of considering and fostering community interests, the
process of disclosure can raise management’s consciousness about
the corporation’s practices in community interest areas such that
improvements to behavior result. 215
Third, under the non-hybrid approach, costs to both the
government, in implementing and enforcing the regulation, and
corporations, by way of indoor management costs, will be high.
Moreover, pre-determining particular community interests that must
be satisfied limits—but does not completely obviate—the ability of
the corporation to link its business strengths to community interests.
However, since most communities face only a few irreversible
interests, the scope of this regulation should be relatively narrow. By
limiting the scope of the regulation, costs should, therefore,
be contained.

Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
212. The law’s expressive function results in norm changes as a result of internalization of
the norm, through a process of shaming, or by becoming a focal point to which others
gravitate towards. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 210; Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of
Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000); Elizabeth S. Anderson &
Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503
(2000); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649
(2000).
213. See BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 55, at 223.
214. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Therapeutic Disclosure, 4 SEC. REG. L.J. 263, 265 (1976).
215. Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage
What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1342–52 (1996); Merritt B. Fox, Required
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V. CONCLUSION
Tönnies, it appears, was shortsighted in his view of the disparities
between corporations and communities. The notion of a corporateGemeinschaft need not be abominable. On the contrary, as the small
number of corporations already fostering community interests
suggests, a corporation-community can be a laudable idea, not the
least because it generates mutual benefits for both the community
and the corporation.
Nevertheless, the most important aspect of governing corporatecommunity relations is the need for corporations to identify or
interact with their operating community. Without this requirement,
corporate consideration of community interests can easily turn into a
meaningless public relations exercise or an exercise in paternalistic
behavior. Indeed, as the case studies evidence, fostering sustainable
improvements to a community, which can simultaneously benefit
corporations, only occurs after a corporation has been able to view
itself, even if only partially, as part of the community.
Yet despite the advantages of transforming corporate-community
relations from antagonistic to harmonious in nature, it is unclear why
there are only a few efforts at promoting good corporate-community
relationships. While certain industry associations, a handful of
countries, and a few international organizations have taken steps
towards promoting links between corporations and their operating
communities, certainly more could be done to facilitate this
relationship. In this regard, the Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft model is
offered as one further step towards uniting the interests of
corporations and communities.
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